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During the 1920s the Chinese northeastern city of Harbin was the location of a unique 
administrative experiment. This city, the hub for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) 
concession was now the capital of the newly created Special District of the Three Eastern 
Provinces (hereafter Special District), a Chinese controlled and Chinese administered 
district designed to replace the formerly Russian controlled concession. Before 1917 the 
concession had been a virtual Russian colony in northern China and within its boundar-
ies local government, education, commerce, the language of daily life was Russian. The 
Chinese lived, as they commented, as “guests” in their own country. After 1917, the 
“guests” asserted their rights to be the “host,” that is, to be the city’s dominant group. 
Harbin, and the Special District, was also the site of two conflicts, or debates, that re-
flected the cultural tensions in a changed political context between the Chinese, once 
the colonized, and the Russians, once the colonizers. Each debate focused on how the 
Russian elite represented the Chinese and their culture as pre-modern, and demonstrated 
how entangled the two Chinese and Russian projects of creating a modern Manchuria 
had become. This entanglement, highlighted in the 1924 Opera Riots, and the 1929 
museum scandal, could have only happened on the two empires’ periphery, where both 
the Chinese and Russian empires met. As imperial frontier, and periphery to both China 
and Russia each polity built the CER railway zone, and the successor Special District, in 
their own image. This extended beyond the railroad to the building of cities, the found-
ing of schools and universities and the imposition of their own cultures and vision of 
modernity on this frontier periphery.
This paper argues that these two competing, yet similar, visions of colonial modernity 
required that the Russians publically represent the Chinese as pre-modern. The first, in 
1924, was a public protest over the depiction of Chinese characters at a charity opera 
performance to a multi-national audience. The second was a 1929 debate within the 
confines of an academic research museum, merged with regional politics. Each event 
shared similar characteristics, elite Chinese protesting the depiction, representation, and 
exhibition of contemporary Chinese people and culture by members of Harbin’s es-
tablished Russian community. Each conflict brought to the stage, in the first instance 
the very real stage of Harbin’s opera, in the second the curatorial “stage” of the public 
museum, with its attendant belief of objective representation, a debate over the relative 
modernity and developmental stage of Harbin’s competing elites.
Representation of self and other, it will be seen, became a means by which each elite, 
both jockeying for position in the changed political and cultural context of the 1920s 
Special District, attempted to impose their own version of modernity on the region. The 
Chinese elite, now co-administrators on the railway, had imposed a Chinese manage-
rial administrative structure over the former Russian colonial government, and a new 
Chinese managerial class to supervise the transition of the Special District from informal 
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Russian colony to Chinese district. Despite the fact the Russian’s had lost extraterritorial 
status, Harbin’s Russian elite had maintained much of its economic and administrative 
power, its “cultural capital” in the words of one Chinese journalist, in the new Special 
District.1 Although this continued privileged position was a conscious decision, and 
acknowledgement, by the new Chinese political overlords that Russians were essential to 
the Special District, the Russian elite used this “capital” to justify a continued Russian 
domination over Harbin’s political, economic, social, and cultural life in the press, and as 
will be seen, on the operatic and curatorial stage. This Russian depiction of the Chinese 
as a people, too undeveloped and culturally immature to administer the sophisticated 
economic and political machine that was the Special District, justified continued Rus-
sian economic and cultural dominance, and can be seen as a strategic cultural response 
to their loss of political power. 
The strategy worked, however, because of the particular circumstances of the Harbin and 
the railway zone as a place of competing modernities. Both the Russian founders and the 
Chinese administers who inherited the district in the 1920s had a vision of the railway 
zone as a modern district. The Chinese admired what the Russians had created and did 
not want to radically change the district it, only improve it under Chinese supervision. 
Harbin then became the locus of a cultural transfer, in which the Chinese took on the 
Russian administrative and economic project, including elements of Russian culture, 
such as opera. This cultural transfer, emblematic of the District’s multiple modernities, 
and the entanglements that would lead to the disputed cultural territory of the opera 
and the museum. 
What gave this debate added importance was the Special District’s place in the Rus-
sian and Chinese colonial imaginations. Despite Russian or Chinese long-term claims 
over the Chinese northeast, also known as Manchuria, the fact remained that the Chi-
nese northeast had only been recently been attached to the Chinese polity, while Russia 
had interests in the region dating back centuries. Manchuria, ethnic homeland of the 
Qing dynasty, had been officially closed to Chinese immigration, although unofficially 
settlement had been taking place for at least two hundred years in southern Manchuria. 
Northern Manchuria, however, had a relatively small Chinese population. Only after the 
Qing government agreed to the construction of the CER as a joint Sino-Russian venture, 
did large numbers of Russians and Chinese arrive in the region. Only after 1905 did the 
Qing government formerly divide Manchuria into three new Chinese provinces, in part 
to establish a Chinese administrative fact in the face of growing Russian and Japanese 
imperial interest. 
The CER concession had been developed in the late 1890s and early 1900s as not only a 
railroad, but as a complete Russian community. Taking advantage of a discrepancy in the 
translation of the original CER contract the Imperial Russian Government was able to 
	 The	Harbin	Municipal	Government	on	the	Eve	of	Reforms,	in:	Novosti	Zhizni,	2	July	924,	United	States	National	
Archive	Record	Group	(hereafter	USNA-RG)	59,	M329	Roll	00,	File	893.02H/44,	7	July	924.	
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build a virtual colony in northern China.2 From this dispute over semantics, backed by 
Russian power, grew CER Russian concession administration. The company controlled 
all institutions of this fully developed European community, the railroad, the city coun-
cils, schools, hospitals, and museums. Following the 1917 revolution the CER conces-
sion became a colony abandoned by its motherland. Spurning, and spurned by, the new 
USSR, the concession was forced into a new relationship with the Chinese government 
and local Chinese elite.
On 31 October 1920, by special order of the Chinese President, Russian extra-territori-
ality was ended and the Chinese government created the Special District, in the former 
CER zone. The CER was charged with creating for itself a new role, that of sound finan-
cial institution. Nevertheless, from 1920 to 1924 Chinese administrators left the original 
colonial mandate of the CER intact, albeit under new Russian supervisors. In 1920, 
a new General Manager was appointed, B. V. Ostroumov. A former colonial bureau-
crat from the Russian Far East, Ostroumov was a man accustomed to building a strong 
Russian colonial presence. His new challenge was to make the CER a viable economic 
concern but his experience as a colonial administrator colored his directorship. He ex-
panded CER investment into health resorts, factories, experimental agricultural farms, 
and research societies. Largely successful, these changes were presented as benefiting the 
general welfare of the Special District, but laid Ostroumov open to the charge that he 
was re-colonizing the Special District, in the name of progress and modernity, for the 
benefit of the Russian community. 
In 1923, the 25th anniversary celebrations gave the CER the opportunity to highlight 
Russian contributions to the region’s development. The railway was still dominated by 
a Russian managerial class who saw its role as employer for the Russian population and 
the promotion of regional economic development.3 The twenty-fifth anniversary gave 
these Russian leaders the opportunity to pioneer a new vision of Russian leadership in 
Northeastern China, except it was a vision of modernization driven Russian technol-
ogy, Russian talent and supposed objective development targets, albeit supervised by 
Russians. The highly successful Jubilee exhibition highlighted the CER’s contribution 
to northeastern frontier modernization and economic progress. In all exhibits and pub-
lications references to the railway’s connection to the Czarist government were dropped. 
Instead, the Chinese Eastern was portrayed as a pure economic enterprise, which had 
opened the Chinese northeast to Chinese and Russian colonization. Although Chinese 
labor contributions were acknowledged, the underlying message was Russian planning, 
capital, and expertise that had created the modern northeast.
2	 “Lands	necessary	for	the	construction	of	the	railroad	in	the	vicinity	of	the	line	will	be	turned	over	to	the	compa-
ny	freely.	The	company	shall	have	the	absolute	and	exclusive	right	of	the	administration	of	its	lands.	La Société 
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However, it is not only by exhibitions and by material distinctions to old employees that 
this holiday should be observed. The Railway is an emblem of Russian genius. With the 
efforts of the Russian mind, and with Russian energy this country, which had slept for 
centuries, was awakened but improved and made to blossom with material and cul-
tural progress. The might of the Russian mind was shown through the combined efforts 
of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Bearing this in mind the Railway should erect a 
number of monuments which would serve as an inspiration to further efforts on behalf 
of this country. The Russian population of the Railway Zone has the right to demand, in 
the view of the fact that it is with its efforts that the railway has been placed in its pres-
ent condition, that out of the budget of millions of rubles that the requirements of this 
population should be satisfied.4
Although the CER’s history was published in both languages, a “narrative of some 690 
pages (which) justified and glorified Russian work and achievements in building the 
CER and Harbin,”5 and four scholarships, two each in honour of CER pioneers, were 
established, all jubilee activities took place in Pristan, with its predominately European 
and Russian population. Harbin’s Municipal Council, still dominated by Russian mem-
bers, featured prominently in all activities. From the opera at the railway club, the sing-
ing of a Te Deum in the Russian cathedral, the dance in the municipal gardens, all events 
signaled that the jubilee was a Russian celebration.6
The first debate took place on the stage of Harbin’s opera, one year after the 1923 jubilee. 
In this conflict member’s of Harbin’s elite Chinese community contested representations 
on stage, of Chinese and Chinese culture as servile and pre-modern. European opera in 
Harbin was serious business, patronized by both Chinese and Russian elites. At a time 
when many North American cities could not support a permanent company, opera was 
performed in Harbin twice a week at the Railway club and other performances were 
scheduled around the city. The theater in the CER club was lavishly appointed and its 
performances subsidized by the company, stressing the railway’s commitment to the best 
of European civilization. Everybody in Harbin went to the opera, including Chinese, 
according to an American journalist.7 In the Special District’s dual cultural context both 
Russian and Chinese elites patronage of European opera illustrates the entangled na-
ture of the District’s culture, in which both elites accepted European opera as a cultural 
marker of modernity.
The particular incident arose from the performance of two operas on 12 January 1924. 
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of the Russo-Chinese Technical Institute. In performance were “The Mandarin’s Son” by 
Cesar Cui and “The Geisha” by Sidney Jones as well as some Russian light opera. The 
intention was to celebrate the Special District’s two leading populations, Chinese and 
Russian,8 and in the audience were CER manager Ostroumov and leading members of 
Harbin’s economic, diplomatic and political communities.
Both the Cui and the Jones piece depicted Chinese and Chinese life in a manner that the 
Chinese members of the audience found insulting. “The Mandarin’s Son,” composed in 
1858 by the Russian Cui, is an orientalist fantasy depicting the romantic difficulties of a 
young Chinese servant, in love with his patron’s daughter. The inn where he works is to 
be visited by a high official who is revealed as the boy’s father and all romantic difficul-
ties are resolved. The Chinese objected to the portrayal of slavish relations between the 
classes, and the depiction of the Chinese ruling class as hopelessly corrupt.9 One Russian 
source said the piece portrayed the Chinese as “total idiots.”10
“The Geisha” by Sidney Jones was a very popular English music hall piece, widely trans-
lated, which depicted a day in a Japanese brothel. The brothel was run by a “Chinaman” 
Wun-hi, described in the libretto as “devious.” The plot concerns the efforts of one geisha 
to marry her Japanese lover and an English woman’s attempt to disguise herself as Japa-
nese in order to woo back her fiancée. In the libretto, both the Japanese and the English 
characters speak in normal, correct English. Only the Chinese character Wun-Hi, speaks 
in a broken pidgin English – presumably translated into Harbin pidgin Russian.
Wun-hi. Oh dearee me! Oh dearee me! This is very awkward – and most obstreperous! 
He wantee O Mimosa San, and O Mimosa San makee sing-song for 
English officer, who givee me plenty much money. What will Wun-hi tell 
Marquis?
Juliette. A Chinaman is never at a loss for a lie.
Wun-hi. Me very like a woman! Oh, here he comes! This very awkward, most 
unrelishable. What me do? You, Frenchee girl, be very nice to Marquis. 
Perhaps Marquis like French girlee – leave Mimosa San – makee much 
money for me!11 
In the second act Wun-hi bows repeatedly to a Japanese official: in the Harbin produc-
tion Wun-hi was slapped repeatedly.12 
General Ma, representing the Chinese Municipal Bureau and a devotee of Russian opera, 
		8	 Letter	to	the	editor	of	the	„International“,	30	January	924,	from	USNA-RG59	Roll	53	M36	86.77/337.
		9	 The	Mandarin’s	Son.	http//php.indiana.edu/~Ineff/russmus/cui/syn.html.	Last	visit	August	200.	The	opera	 is	
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walked out during the performance of “Geisha” and members of the Chinese elite fol-
lowed him. What followed was a furor in the Chinese press and demonstrations against 
Ostroumov and the émigré Russian CER administration. The Chinese press condemned 
the two pieces as degrading and insulting to China and took great offense to the pleasure 
quarters setting of the piece and the depiction of Chinese life as corrupt and backward. 
The obsequious behavior of the Chinese character, “Wun-hi” towards a Japanese offi-
cial, garnered particular fury in the Chinese press. On 20 January, at a joint meeting of 
three Binjiang13 self-governing societies-- ostensibly called to discuss paving Fujiadian’s14 
roads-- the participants resolved that the operas had been an insult “to the dignity of 
the state and all Chinese” and formed a committee to unify CER employees and protest 
to the authorities.15 The protest took place on 19 February, when a crowd of several 
hundred, described as “mostly coolies and boys”, marched from Fujiadian into Pristan, 
stopping at the office of the CER’s Chinese president and moving on to the CER’s main 
administration building. They carried banners and shouted “down with Ostroumov.” 
The demonstration was described as peaceful and that the Chinese police were alerted 
and kept order.16 
Non-Chinese newspaper did not understand what the furor was about, and that these 
performances were perceived by the Chinese as insulting and degrading. Instead, the 
demonstrations were blamed on national chauvinism. In one Russian paper the “Fujia-
tian (sic) press” was blamed for creating animosity against the Russians and the CER.17 
The foreign press cast doubts on the protestor’s nationalist feelings, writing that they 
were bribed with food and drink. “It (the demonstration) is not an indication of popular 
feeling. It is not an expression of popular wrath, but merely a rude imitation of it. The 
people of Harbin know full well by what means Chinese popular wrath is staged.”18 
The demonstrations were thus portrayed as illegitimate: the sentiments manufactured 
by the Chinese elite for their own selfish purposes. Lacking in the Russian press was any 
attempt on the part of the Russians or other foreigners to see the Chinese point of view. 
Never was the choice of performing these operas considered by the Russians as a severe 
lack of judgment and exercise in bad taste. That, Russians could not comprehend why 
two performances, depicting Chinese as corrupt, servile, and pre-modern, with leading 
members of the Chinese community in the audience, were insulting, demonstrates that 
these Russians still believed that Chinese and their culture were not modern, a belief es-
sential for the maintenance of Russian superiority in the Special District. 
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ners in the Special District. If a modern Special District could only be achieved under a 
Russian managerial class, than it followed that the Chinese were incapable of achieving 
this vision. Thus, the opera depictions were consistent with the Russian émigré belief 
system. What the Chinese elite objected to was the making explicit of what had been up 
to that point, implicit. The Jubilee celebrations and the new CER regime had not overtly 
stated that the Chinese were incapable of managing a modern administration, although 
it was implicit in the Russian re-imagining of the Special District. 
What the Russian and foreign press seemed to most object to was that the Chinese had 
publicly protested-- that they had claimed public space in Harbin’s European neighbor-
hoods. The stories that attracted the most attention in the Russian press were the pur-
ported chants of “We will throw the Russians into the Sungari River!”19, as the Chinese 
marched towards the Russian cathedral although the Chinese administration said the in-
cident did not take place.20 Even if these chants were not voiced that this detail was taken 
up by the Russian press shows an underlying sense of frustration, fear, and powerlessness. 
The power dynamic had changed and these rumors were the acknowledgement that the 
Chinese were in control and if they wanted, could indeed “throw the Russians into the 
Sungari.” As demonstrations, the opera protests were relatively tame. Zhang Zuolin, 
Special District head, did not put national insults above the smooth functioning of the 
Special District, ordering the Russian press to cease printing rumors of a Chinese plan to 
expel the Russians. Zhang promised all efforts would be made to stop such rumors and 
both the Chinese and Russian population would be treated with complete equality.21 
Zhang Zuolin then prohibited all further demonstrations and closed the opera issue. 
By the standards of foreigners who choose to see every Chinese meeting as a threat to 
foreign privilege even the Fujiadian nationalists behaved well. There was much shouting 
but no violence during the demonstrations. Given that the Special District Chinese elite 
witnessed the performance, the willingness of the same authorities to defuse rather than 
exploit the issue demonstrated that, for the Chinese administration, peaceful govern-
ment came before “chauvinistic” nationalism.
The second debate over representation and modernity did not end so well for the Rus-
sian community, concluding as it did in the suppression of a Russian research institute. 
This takeover of the research institute, the Manchurian Research Society (Obshchestva 
izucheniia Man’chzurskogo kraia, OIMK according to its Russian abbreviation), must 
also be put into context of growing Russian, especially Russian-Soviet interference in 
the Special District, after the Soviet Union became a co-administrator of the CER after 
1925. OIMK was founded and funded by the CER as a research institute and clearing-
house for information on the CER zone, as part of Ostroumov’s new vision of a railway 
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institute, with a large museum in Harbin, experimental farms, many publications, and 
a generous budget funding its members’ research agendas and providing them with em-
ployment. 
As the CER’s research and development arm, OIMK was devoted to the ethnographic, 
economic, anthropological, botanical and historical study of northeastern China.22 Dur-
ing the seven years it operated, the society published numerous proceedings and by 
1929 had 800 members.23 The society operated a museum with over 62,000 exhibits, a 
publishing house, botanical garden, library, and archive.24 The society had many success-
ful exhibitions, in Harbin and abroad; sponsored many research expeditions across the 
northeast and contributed much to the study of northeastern China. OIMK’s publica-
tions extolled the virtues of the northeast’s untapped natural resources and the CER as 
the best tool to tap them, a land to be conquered by technology and research.25 Within 
Harbin OIMK was an important institution and its members were acknowledged as the 
intellectual leaders of the community. 
 Specific Chinese criticisms of OIMK’s activities concerned the displacement of Chinese 
farmers on OIMK’s experimental farm, the representation and periodization of Chinese 
culture in OIMK’s publication and museum, and the overall Russian context in which 
OIMK’s work was presented. Unacknowledged in the criticisms was the use of the terms 
“Manchurian” and “region” in OIMK’s work, a semiotic glimpse into how OIMK saw 
the Chinese northeast and the contribution of Russians to it. 
OIMK’s researchers emphasized the northeast as a region, rather than as a Chinese ad-
ministrative unit, therefore not one particular culture or nationality dominated their 
work. In the Russian language, krai contains the meaning of “territory” in the sense of an 
administrative unit. It was used in the title of various Russian Far Eastern territories such 
as Amurskii krai (Amur Territory or Region) and Primorskii krai (Maritime Territory). 
The use of krai, instead of the Chinese word for the area dong sheng (Eastern Provinces), 
and the use of the even more vague Manchuria in OIMK’s English translations suggested 
an the region had an ambiguous relationship to Chinese sovereignty. Designating this 
area as a “region or as “Manchurian” had (and still has) never been accepted by the Chi-
nese because it suggests the area’s distinct identity. Although there is historical evidence 
for the area’s unique and separate identity, by the 1920s the northeast had been fully 
integrated into the Chinese state. The Chinese elite had watched in frustration, when 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s, both Japan and Russia tried to detach the northeast 
from China through a program of railway colonization. OIMK’s claim that the Chinese 
northeast, as a region, shared characteristics and development potential with the Rus-
sian Far East and Korea did not resonate well for a Chinese elite with its own national 
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“region” in its title OIMK could be accused of having its own agenda. If the northeast 
was not Chinese what was it – and whose was it?
OIMK’s construction of northeast ethnographic history was another point where Chi-
nese and Russian constructions of local identity diverged. For example, the society fol-
lowed established Russian scientific practice of periodizing the region’s ethnic groups by 
time of settlement. Since Chinese settlement in the northeast occurred in the 1890s, 
the same time as Russians arrived, OIMK’s historical narrative of the northeast stressed 
indigenous groups such as the Manchus and the Mongolians and their dress, customs, 
language, economic life. Studies of the Chinese were confined to either ancient China 
or contemporary studies of labor, marriage, and economic life. OIMK’s research created 
a hierarchy of contributions by the different ethnic groups to the economic and politi-
cal development of the region, placing a greater value on the Russian, rather then the 
Chinese contribution. 
Chinese perceptions of OIMK having a hidden agenda were also based on the content 
and form of its work. The prominence of economic studies underscored the importance 
of OIMK as a promoter and disseminator of information on the economic life of the 
Northeast. In 1926, 177 researchers, the largest portion of the Society’s membership of 
460, were involved in economic studies.26 These studies ranged from forestry to numer-
ous studies of the soybean, the main agricultural export of the area. These studies high-
lighted the unique characteristics of the area’s flora and fauna. One particular study of 
Manchurian wheat portrayed the species as unique to the region, a synthesis of Russian 
and local varieties.27 Contrasts were drawn between the traditional methods of cultiva-
tion and modern methods promoted by OIMK, however, these modern methods were 
Russian in form and personal. OIMK publications repeatedly gave the impression, not 
only to the Chinese, that modernity equaled Russian.28
OIMK’s museum was located on Bolshoi Prospect, the main street of Russian Har-
bin. It shared the street with the other visible reminders of Russian power: the railway 
headquarters and club, the Technical University, the Orthodox Cathedral and the main 
department stores. The museum’s curator had divided the space into exhibits on regional 
anthropology and history, economic life and culture. The biggest section was devoted to 
natural science, which stressed cross-border (China and USSR) regional flora and fauna. 
The second largest section was ethnography founded “to collect exhibits, delineating the 
level of existence and culture attained by the indigenous races inhabiting the territory.”29 
In the archeological exhibit the Chinese came second to last in the periodization of the 
region’s peoples, again highlighting the fact the Chinese were also recent immigrants. 
 All exhibits concerning China and the Chinese were found in the museum’s rooms on 
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Thus, there were examples of Chinese arts and crafts, historical displays and models of 
Chinese homes and costume. All emphasized China’s traditional lifestyles and ancient 
past. Exhibits on contemporary industry all concerned with the Russian-controlled rail-
way. There were no examples of the region’s Chinese controlled economy and nothing of 
Chinese industry outside of Manchuria. The exhibition’s message was clear; modernity 
was Russian.30
Although OIMK’s ethnographic/historical expositions highlighted Chinese bronzes, 
Mongolian Buddhism or Manchu costumes, the expositions on contemporary themes, 
such as art, photography or industry, reflected the dominance of a Russian and European 
vision of culture, in part due to the Russian émigré community’s tenuous psychologi-
cal, political, cultural and economic position. Homeless after the creation of the Soviet 
Union, émigrés in China bolstered Russian and European culture not only to preserve 
cultural and community values, but to demonstrate that the émigrés were still European, 
with all the privileges that identity gave in 1920s China. In the Special District European 
and Russian culture had taken on a new and desperate legitimacy. 
This dislike, on the part of the Chinese, for the content of OIMK’s research material 
must also be linked to the Russian context in which it was presented. OIMK, although 
never explicitly promoted as a Russian cultural institution, was in language, socializa-
tion and intent purely Russian. These members of OIMK presented themselves not just 
as Russians, but Russians educated in the best model of Russian liberal enlightenment 
thought. As the number of OIMK members grew, so did the number of honorary Chi-
nese members, local dignitaries and representatives of the provincial and civic elite and 
Chinese educated in Harbin’s Russian school system. Other then these few exceptions, 
there were no active Chinese members and no Chinese language section. In only one 
instance were proceedings published in both languages.31 OIMK remained a source of 
employment for Russian academics centered on the railroad, itself a reminder of Russian 
imperialism, and like the other Russian cultural institutions, OIMK held itself above the 
greater Chinese linguistic, national, and geographic context of the Special District. Since 
the society’s language of publication was Russian, it was difficult to attract the interest of 
local Chinese scholars and academics. The Russian members of OIMK did not question 
their model of science and research into the northeast because this model validated their 
social and ethnic status in Harbin. This elite dominated Harbin society and by the act 
of naming, studying and cataloguing created and filled a new role for themselves and 
the culture they represented. Using the tools which OIMK researchers knew best, they 
dominated their physical and social landscape.
Dogmatic Russian attitudes that only Russians and Russian methods were modern and 
the Chinese were mired in a pre- modern past were illustrated in the conflict over the 
OIMK/CER’s experimental agricultural farm at Anda, a small town on the railway. 
30	 A.	Pachkovskii,	Shest’	 let	(Six	Years),	 in:	 Isvestiia	obshchestva	izucheniia	Man’chzhurskogo	Kraia	(Review	of	the	
Manchurian	Research	Society)	7,	Harbin,	December,	928,	p.	3.
3	 A.P.,	Isvestia	obchestva	izuchenia	Manchurskovo	Kraia,	p.	7.
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OIMK’s Russian authorities had seized land and built a cattle farm and milk procession 
station, ignoring the protests of resident Chinese farmers who argued the land was their 
property. Eventually Chinese farmers, with the permission of local Chinese authorities, 
invaded the experimental farm, divided the land into small plots and destroyed the milk 
processing equipment, which had benefited only the European diet. In the accompany-
ing investigation the Russian authorities could not, or would not, take the Chinese posi-
tion seriously, labeling the farmers “anti-modern,” “feudal” and “dark.” In this case, by 
believing themselves on the side of development and modernity the Russians closed any 
possibility of dialogue with their Chinese partners. The Chinese press actively resisted 
the pre-modern label, instead they argues that the Russians and OIMK had ignored 
the farmers valid claims. The Chinese sources reveal an acute sensitivity about being 
labeled “pre-modern” and a desire to be seen as progressive. This anxiety the Russians 
misunderstood as chauvinism, the need to pursue Chinese interests to the detriment of 
the “greater” good. Thus, the toxic misunderstanding between the two elites was well 
established, even before OIMK was suppressed.
By 1929, the Chinese municipal and provincial elites were actively campaigning to 
change OIMK’s status, leading to its incorporation into the Chinese provincial educa-
tional system. This campaign was also related to elite Chinese concerns about growing 
Soviet influence. In 1924, the Chinese government, tired of what they perceived as Rus-
sian émigré neo-colonialism, signed an agreement giving the Russian power of the jointly 
administered railway to the Soviet Union. Almost immediately the Chinese discovered 
they had exchanged one colonial vision for another. The USSR very much saw the CER 
as part of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, and used its position in the Special 
District to advance its version of soviet socialism. Soviet advisors interfered in municipal 
politics and used CER funded institutions, such as schools or OIMK, to pursue their 
agenda.
In language and form OIMK was seen as a “private” institution of the Harbin Rus-
sian community and not the public, non-political research institute it claimed to be. In 
1929, with a war over the railway looming with the USSR, OIMK was placed under 
the authority of the local Chinese government. That same year exhibits on the Manchu 
and Mongol peoples from OIMK’s Harbin museum were removed on order of OIMK’s 
new Chinese directors, recently appointed by the Chinese controlled Special District, 
because they were “uninteresting.”32 OIMK’s new Chinese directors substituted for these 
exhibitions of “regional” dress and daily life, an exhibition on Soviet industrialization, 
associating these Chinese elites with Soviet modernity, even as the same elite opposed 
Soviet interference in the district’s affairs. OIMK’s museum was the “exhibitionary”33 
manifestation of OIMK’s greater project to render the Chinese northeast as an ordered 
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class. From the Chinese point of view, the society served the former Russian colonials. 
The Chinese elite understood OIMK’s museum as political, “in other words, lies not just 
in the policy statements and intentions but also in the apparently non-political and even 
minor details such as the architecture of buildings, the classification and juxtaposition 
of artifacts.”34 In marginalizing Chinese contributions to the hoary past, in ignoring the 
claims of Chinese farmers, in the use of politically ambiguous terms such as “region’ and 
“Manchurian,” and by presenting their findings only in Russian, OIMK was sending a 
clear message. The region’s political identity was doubtful, that Chinese were not modern 
and could not be expected to meaningfully contribute to regional development. 
Conclusion
The question of who would be the guest and the host in Manchuria was one that could 
not be solved through political change alone. Although the region was politically Chi-
nese, Manchuria was a border frontier of recent settlement by both Russian and Chinese. 
It was a perphiphery to both empires, in which each empire competed to build their own 
‘modern’ Manchuria. The CER concession, later the Special District, was the product of 
both peoples and polities, illustrating the entangled natures of the cultural transfer in the 
Chinese northeast. Each had contributed labour, money, and technology to northeast 
China, first in the form of the Russian-controlled CER concession, then as the Chi-
nese-administered Special District. After 1917, with their real political power gone, the 
Russian elite attempted to retain its status by remaking itself as a developmental elite, 
best equipped to modernize the northeast. The former colonizer had become the uneasy 
subject of the former colonized who were intent on taking over the Russian development 
project and imposing Chinese direction and reform. In this context of post-colonial 
competitive visions of modern development whoever could best direct the exploitation 
of the region and its rich resources could claim the title of “host.” The stage was Manchu-
ria itself and how elite Chinese and Russians represented themselves and each other. That 
the Russians would assume the role of host in this changed post-colonial context irritated 
the Chinese elite, eager to prove that northern Manchuria could be both “modern” and 
“Chinese.” Both groups clashed over depictions over how Chinese culture was staged 
by Russians, either on the real stage of Harbin’s opera house, or the exhibitory stage of 
OIMK’s vision of pre-modern Chinese culture that implied modernity could only be 
Russian. Both examples demonstrated that in this bi-cultural and bi-racial northeastern 
border town the ways in which each community presented itself and represented the 
other, indeed even whose representation of modernity would prevail, resulted in an iden-
tity politics debate that we in the 21st century find familiar today.
34	 Ibid.
